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1 Introduction
Humans have limited capacity to process information when making decisions. People often ignore
some pieces of information and pay attention to some others. In seminal contributions, Sims (1998,
2003) formalizes limited attention as a constraint on information flow and models decision-making
with limited attention as optimization subject to this constraint. Such a framework for rational
inattention (RI) has wide applications in economics as surveyed by Sims (2011) and Maćkowiak,
Matějka, and Wiederholt (2018). Despite the rapid growth of this literature, most theories and
applications have been limited to univariate models.
Multivariate RI models are difficult to analyze both theoretically and numerically, especially
in dynamic settings. Because many economic decision problems involve multivariate states and
multivariate choices, it is of paramount importance to make progress in this direction as Sims
(2011) points out. Our paper contributes to the literature by developing a framework for analyzing
multivariate RI problems in a linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control setup.1 The LQG control
setup has a long tradition in economics and can deliver analytical results to understand economic
intuition. It is also useful to derive numerical solutions for approximating nonlinear dynamic models
(Kydland and Prescott (1982)). We formulate the LQG control problem under RI in both finite- and
infinite-horizon setups as a problem of choosing both the control and information structure. The
decision maker observes a noisy signal about the unobserved controlled states. The signal vector is a
linear transformation of the states plus a noise. The signal dimension, the linear transformation, and
the noise covariance matrix are all endogenously chosen subject to the information-flow constraint.
Our second contribution is to develop an efficient three-step solution procedure. The first step
is to apply the certainty equivalence principle to derive the optimal control. This step follows
from the standard control literature. The second step is to transform the control problem under
RI into a tracking problem under RI, in which only the information structure needs to be solved.
The tracking objective is to minimize the weighted mean squared error with the weighting matrix
endogenously derived from the first step. In the last step we transform the tracking problem under
RI into a rate distortion problem in information theory (Cover and Thomas (2006)). We then use
the semidefinite programming approach (Vandenberghe, Boyd, and Wu (1998) and Tanaka et al
(2017)) to solve this problem to obtain the optimal information structure for any information-flow
rate. This approach can be implemented using the publicly available semidefinite programming
solver SDPT3 (Toh, Todd, and Tutuncu (1999) and Tutuncu, Toh, and Todd (2003)). This solver
can handle optimization problems up to 100 dimensions accurately, robustly, and efficiently.
We are able to derive three sets of novel characterization results. First, we provide a full
characterization for the static RI problem. We prove that the optimal information structure is
1See Sims (2006), Matějka and McKay (2015), and Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2018) for static non-Gaussian RI
models.
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characterized by a generalized reverse water-filling solution. This result generalizes Theorem 10.3.3
in Cover and Thomas (2006, p. 314) by allowing for a semidefinite weighting matrix in the tracking
objective and correlated state uncertainty. In this case the decision maker attends more to the larger
eigenvalue of the weighted prior covariance matrix, instead of the prior variance. We prove that the
optimal signal dimension is equal to the rank of the weighting matrix when the information-flow
rate is sufficiently large or the tracking error (distortion) is sufficiently small. The signal dimension
decreases as the information-flow rate decreases. Since the rank of the weighting matrix cannot
exceed the minimum of the state and control dimensions, the signal dimension can never exceed
this minimum. We also show that initially independent states are ex post correlated when the
weighting matrix is not diagonal as Sims (2011) notices using numerical examples.
Second, we prove that a similar generalized reverse water-filling solution and its implied proper-
ties also apply to the dynamic multivariate RI problem when the state transition matrix is diagonal
with equal lag coefficients. This includes two special cases: (i) the state vector is serially indepen-
dently and identically distributed (IID), conditional on a control, and (ii) all states are equally
persistent AR(1) processes with correlated innovations.
Third, we prove that the optimal signal is one dimensional in the special case in which the rank
of the weighting matrix is equal to one. This case happens when there is only one control variable,
even though there are multiple states. The optimal signal is equal to the optimal control under full
information plus a noise in the static case and in the dynamic case, in which the state transition
matrix is diagonal with equal lag coefficients.
Based on extensive numerical experiments for the general dynamic models, we find that some of
the preceding results still apply. For example, the signal dimension cannot exceed the minimum of
the state and control dimensions and decreases as the information-flow rate decreases. Moreover,
both the weight of the state in tracking variables and its innovation variance are important for
attention allocation. Notably the persistence of the state, instead of the innovation variance, plays
a dominant role in allocating attention and determining the responsiveness to shocks.
Our third contribution is to apply our results to three economic problems. Our first application
is the price setting problem studied by Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009), in which there are two
exogenous state variables representing two sources of uncertainty. The profit-maximizing price is
equal to a linear combination of the two shocks. We ignore the general equilibrium effect and just
focus on the decision problem. Because there is only one choice variable (i.e., price), the optimal
signal is one dimensional and can be normalized as the profit-maximizing price plus a noise in the
dynamic case when the persistence is the same for all states. This result implies that the initial
price responses to a shock with the same size to different states are the same, independent of the
state’s innovation variance, when the profit-maximizing price puts equal weight on the states.
By contrast, when the persistence is not identical, the optimal signal is still one dimensional
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and equal to a linear combination of the states, but it does not take the preceding form. We find
that the firm attends more to a more persistent state by allocating a larger relative weight to that
state in the signal. Moreover, the initial responses are larger to a more persistent state independent
of its innovation variance relative to the other state within an economically reasonable range of
parameter values.
The results above are in sharp contrast to those reported by Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009).
They assume that the firm receives a separate signal for a different source of uncertainty. While they
justify this signal independence assumption by bounded rationality and tractability, this assumption
is not innocuous because it is suboptimal for the original RI problem and also leads to some
qualitatively different predictions.
Our second application is the consumption/saving problem analyzed by Sims (2003), in which
there is an endogenous state variable (wealth) and two exogenous persistent state variables (income
shocks). We find that the optimal signal is still one dimensional even for a very large information-
flow rate. The initial responses of consumption are larger for a more persistent income shock,
independent of its innovation variance relative to other shocks. This result is consistent with that
in the pricing example, but in sharp contrast to Sims’s (2003) finding. His Figures 7 and 8 show
that the initial consumption responses to the less persistent income shock with a larger innovation
variance is larger. Moreover, he assumes that the optimal signal is three dimensional.
Our last application is the firm investment problem in which the firm makes both tangible
and intangible capital investment. We find that the signal dimension drops from two to one as
the information-flow rate gradually decreases. Sims (1998, 2003) argues that an information-flow
constraint can substitute for adjustment costs in a dynamic optimization problem. Our numerical
results show that this constraint can generate inertia and delayed responses of investment to shocks,
just like capital adjustment costs. Moreover, we find that RI combined with capital adjustment
costs can generate hump-shaped investment responses.
We now discuss the related literature. Sims (2003) is the first paper that studies multivariate
RI models in the infinite-horizon stationary LQG setup.2 His framework and solution methods are
different from ours. He formulates the LQG RI problem without explicit reference to the signal
structure. His solution procedure consists of two steps. The first step is to use the certainty
equivalence principle to derive the optimal control. This step is the same as ours. The second step
is to transform the control problem under RI into a tracking problem under RI.3 This problem
can be further transformed into a problem of choosing an optimal conditional covariance matrix
for the state vector. This is a deterministic nonlinear convex optimization problem, which is the
2Sims (2011) provides a summary of his approach. Luo (2008), Luo and Young (2010), and Luo, Nie and Young
(2015) follow Sims’s approach closely, but mainly focus on univariate models. Sims’s approach is correct in the
univariate case.
3We find that the weighting matrix presented in Sims (2003) is incorrect because it may not be semidefinite.
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same as in our second step for the infinite-horizon stationary case. Sims suggests to first derive
the first-order conditions for this problem, ignoring the no-forgetting constraint. After solving the
first-order conditions using a nonlinear equation solver, check whether the no-forgetting constraint
binds. If it does not bind, then we obtain the solution. Otherwise, apply a Cholesky decomposition
to perform a change of variable. Derive the first-order condition for the new variable and solve this
first-order condition using a nonlinear equation solver. Sims (2003) suggests the optimal signal is
typically equal to the state vector plus a noise. The impulse responses are generated by the Kalman
filter based on this signal vector. He does notice the possibility that the signal vector is only equal
to a linear combination of a subset of state variables. But he does not offer an explicit solution.
Solving first-order conditions using nonlinear equation methods can be numerically inefficient
and not robust. The convergence is highly sensitive to the initial condition. More importantly,
Sims’s approach does not solve for the optimal information structure. His choice of the signal
as the state plus noise is typically suboptimal for multivariate RI problems so that the impulse
response functions generated by that signal vector are incorrect. Based on our theoretical and
numerical results discussed earlier, we find that the no-forgetting constraint often binds and the
signal dimension does not exceed the minimum of the control and state dimensions.
Because of the difficulty of solving multivariate RI models, researchers often make simplifying
assumptions. For example, Peng (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006), Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009,
2015), Van Niewerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), and Zorn (2018) impose the signal independence
assumption or some restriction on the signal form. An undesirable implication of this assumption
is that initially independent states remain ex post independent. Mondria (2010) and Kacperczyk,
Van Niewerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016) remove this assumption in static finance models. The
former paper considers only two independent assets (states), while the latter studies the case of
many assets given some invertibility restriction on the signal form. Except for Maćkowiak and
Wiederholt (2009, 2015) and Zorn (2018), all these papers study static models.
In independent work Fulton (2018) analyzes similar multivariate RI problems in the static case
and derives results similar to our generalized reverse water-filling solution. Fulton (2017) discusses
dynamic RI tracking problems and proposes an approximation method for the special case of low
information costs (or high information-flow rate).4 Maćkowiak, Matějka, and Wiederholt (2018)
study a dynamic tracking problem with one control and one exogenous state, which follows an
ARMA(p,q) process. They also briefly discuss the extension to the case with multiple exogenous
states, but still with one control. Consistent with our result, the optimal signal is one dimensional.
Our approach is different from those in these three papers and applies to general dynamic LQG
control problems under RI with both multiple states and multiple controls.
4We would like to thank Gianluca Violante for pointing out Fulton’s papers to us, when we presented a preliminary
version of our paper in a conference in the summer of 2018.
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2 LQG Control Problems with Rational Inattention
We start with a finite-horizon linear-quadratic control problem under rational inattention. Let the
nx dimensional state vector xt follow the linear dynamics
xt+1 = Atxt +Btut + εt+1, t = 0, 1, ..., T, (1)
where ut is an nu dimensional control variable and εt+1 is a serially independent Gaussian random
vector with mean zero and covariance matrix Wt. The matrix Wt is positive semidefinite, denoted
by Wt  0.5 The state transition matrix At and the control coefficient matrix Bt are deterministic
and conformable. The state vector xt may contain both exogenous states such as AR(1) shocks
and endogenous states such as capital.
Suppose that the decision maker does not observe the state xt perfectly, but observes a multi-
dimensional noisy signal st about xt given by
st = Ctxt + vt, t = 0, 1, ..., T, (2)
where Ct is a conformable deterministic matrix and vt is a serially independent Gaussian random
variable with mean zero and covariance matrix Vt  0. Assume that x0 is a Gaussian random
variable with mean x̄0 and covariance matrix Σ0. The random variables εt, vt, and x0 are all
mutually independent for all t. The decision maker’s information set at date t is generated by
st = {s0, s1, ..., st} . The control ut is measurable with respect to st.
Suppose that the decision maker is boundedly rational and has limited information-processing




























Here H (·|·) denotes the conditional entropy operator.7 Let s−1 = ∅. Intuitively, entropy measures
uncertainty. At each time t, given past information st−1, observing st reduces uncertainty about
xt. The total uncertainty reduction from time 0 to time T is measured by the expression on the
5We use the conventional matrix inequality notations: W  () W̃ means that W − W̃ is positive definite
(semidefinite) and W ≺ () W̃ means W − W̃ is negative definite (semidefinite).




≤ κ. One may consider the per period capacity by dividing by 1/T. Sims
(2011) introduces discounting to the conditional mutual information in (3). Our approach applies to this formulation
with suitable changes.
7See Cover and Thomas (2006) or Sims (2011) for the definitions of entropy, conditional entropy, mutual informa-
tion, and conditional mutual information.
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left-hand side of the inequality in (3). The decision maker can process information by choosing
the information structure represented by {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 for the signal st, but the rate of uncertainty
reduction is limited by an upper bound κ. For example, if Ct is equal to the identity matrix and





the information-flow constraint (3).
Notice that the choice of {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 implies that the dimension of the signal vector st and the
correlation structure of the noise vt are endogenous and may vary over time. One may imagine the
decision maker makes decisions sequentially. He first chooses the information structure {Ct, Vt}Tt=0




to maximize an objective function. Suppose
that the objective function is quadratic. We are ready to formulate the decision maker’s problem
as follows:

















subject to (1), (2), and (3), where the expectation is taken with resepct to the joint distribution
induced by the initial distribution for x0 and the state dynamics (1).
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1] represents the discount factor. The deterministic matrices Qt, Rt, and
St for all t and PT+1 are conformable and exogenously given. For the infinite-horizon stationary
case, we set T →∞ and remove the time index for all exogenously given matrices At, Bt, Qt, Rt,













st = Cxt + vt (5)
and vt is a serially independent Gaussian random variable with mean zero and covariance matrix
V  0. The interpretation is that the average rate of uncertainty reduction per period is limited by
κ > 0. We now formulate the infinite-horizon problem as follows:














subject to (4), (5), and
xt+1 = Axt +But + εt+1, (6)
for t ≥ 0. Here the expectation is taken with respect to the unconditional stationary distribution.
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In applications, it may also be more convenient to consider the following relaxed problems.
























subject to (1) and (2), where the expectation is taken with resepct to the joint distribution induced
by the initial distribution for x0 and the state dynamics (1).
























subject to (5) and (6) for t = 0, 1, ..., where the expectation is taken with respect to the unconditional
stationary distribution.
In these two problems λ > 0 can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
information-flow constraint or the shadow price (cost) of the information flow. We will focus our
analysis on Problem 1. The solution to Problem 2 is the limit of that to Problem 1. Problems 3
and 4 can be similarly analyzed and are easier to solve because the information-flow constraint is
removed from the optimization.
2.1 Full Information Case
Before analyzing Problem 1, we first present the solution in the full information case, in which the
decision maker observes xt perfectly. The solution can be found in the textbooks by Ljungqvist





for all t = 0, 1, ..., T. Then the value function given a state xt takes the form
vFIt (xt) = −x′tPtxt − gt, (7)
where Pt  0 and satisfies


















gt = βtr (Pt+1Wt) + βgt+1, gT+1 = 0,
for t = 0, 1, ..., T. Here tr(·) denotes the trace operator.
The optimal control is













For the infinite horizon case, all exogenous matrices are time invariant. As T →∞, we obtain
the infinite-horizon solution under some standard stability conditions. The value function is given
by
vFI (xt) = −x′tPxt − g,
where P  0 and satisfies













tr (PW ) .
The optimal control is given by










We solve Problem 1 in three steps. In the first step we observe that Problem 1 is a standard
LQG problem under partial information for fixed {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 . Thus the usual certainty equivalence
principle holds. This implies that the optimal control is given by
ut = −Ftx̂t, (12)




denotes the estimate of xt given information s
t. The state under the optimal
control satisfies
xt+1 = Atxt −BtFtx̂t + εt+1. (13)
By the Kalman filter formula, x̂t follows the dynamics











x̂t|t−1 = (At−1 −Bt−1Ft−1) x̂t−1, (15)
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for t = 0, 1, ..., T , where Σt|t ≡ E
[
(xt − x̂t) (xt − x̂t)′ |st
]






t Ct  0
for t = 0, 1, ..., T.
We now solve for {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 in the remaining two steps. In step 2 we show that {Ct, Vt}
T
t=0 is
determined by a tracking problem. We present all technical proofs in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the assumptions in Section 2.1 are satisfied. Then the optimal control







(xt − x̂t)′Ωt(xt − x̂t)
]
(18)
subject to (2), (3), and (13), where
Ωt = β
tF ′t(Rt + βB
′
tPt+1Bt)Ft  0. (19)
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since the information-flow constraint cannot help




> E [v̂0(x̂0)], where v̂0(x̂0) denotes the initial value





E [v̂0(x̂0)] . In other words, we choose the information structure so as to bring expected utility from
the current date onward as close as possible to the expected utility value under full information.




− E [v̂0(x̂0)] is equal to the expression in (18).
Notice that the matrix Ωt is positive semidefinite because Rt  0 and Pt+1  0. Since Ft is an
nu by nx dimensional matrix, the rank of Ωt, denoted by rank(Ωt), does not exceed the minimum of
the dimension nx of the state vector and the dimension nu of the control vector. Thus it is possible
that Ωt is singular. If nx ≥ nu and Ft has full column rank, then rank(Ωt) = nu. If nx < nu and Ft
has full row rank, then rank(Ωt) = nx.
In the infinite-horizon stationary case, suppose that the initial state is drawn from the stationary


















where the expectation is taken for the stationary distribution and
Ω = F ′(R+ βB′PB)F. (20)
We have the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the assumptions in Section 2.1 hold. The optimal control for Problem





(xt − x̂t)′Ω(xt − x̂t)
]
subject to (4), (5), and
xt+1 = Axt −BFx̂t + εt+1, (21)
where Ω  0 is given by (20).
The previous two propositions state that an optimal information structure in the control problem
under RI can be found by solving tracking problems. It is important that the weighting matrices
Ωt and Ω must be positive semidefinite, which ensure that the tracking problems are well-defined.
2.3 Rate Distortion Function
In the final step of our solution procedure, we transform the tracking problem into a simpler
equivalent problem. We will draw connection to the engineering literature on information theory
(Cover and Thomas (2006)). In this literature the objective function in (18) measures the distance
between sequences xT and x̂T . It is a distortion measure for the source random sequence xT and
its estimate x̂T . Define the function DT (κ) as the minimized distortion for all rates κ > 0 such
that DT (κ) is finite. This function is called a distortion rate function in information theory and is
equal to the minimized objective function in (18) in our context.
A closely related concept is the (information) rate distortion function κT (D) , defined as the
minimized information-flow rate for all distortions D > 0 such that κT (D) is finite. It is determined
by the following problem in our context.
Problem 5 (Finite-horizon rate distortion problem)


















It can be checked that both κT (D) and DT (κ) are decreasing and convex functions. Thus, for
any κ > 0, we can find a D > 0 such that the solution to the rate distortion problem in (22) gives the
solution to the distortion rate problem or the tracking problem in (18) (Cover and Thomas (2006)).
The rate distortion problem is easier to solve numerically because the complex information-flow
constraint is moved into the objective function so that the problem has a semidefinite programming
representation as shown in Section 3.8 We thus focus our analysis on the problem in (22).











































for t = 0, where the functionsH (·) andH (·|·) denote the entropy and conditional entropy operators,















Thus the rate distortion problem becomes



















































Equation (25) follows from (16) and (17). Instead of choosing {Ct} and {Vt} directly, we view
problem (24) as a standard optimal control problem with Σt|t as the state variable and Φt as the
control variable. After obtaining a solution for {Φt}Tt=0 to this problem, we can recover {Ct} and
{Vt} from the following result.
8The relaxed Problems 3 and 4 are also easier to solve than the original Problems 1 and 2.
9The usual base for logarithm in the entropy formula is 2, in which case the unit of information is a “bit.” In this
paper we adopt natural logarithm, in which case the unit is called a “nat.”
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Proposition 3 Given an optimal sequence {Φt}Tt=0 determined from problem (24), an optimal
information structure {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 satisfies Φt = C ′tV
−1






and the mt columns of nx×mt matrix C ′t are orthonormal eigenvectors for all positive
eigenvalues of Φt, denoted by {ϕit}
mt
i=1 . The optimal dimension of the signal vector st is equal to
rank (Φt) = mt ≤ nx.
This proposition shows that the optimal information structure {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 is not unique and can
be computed by the singular-value decomposition. The optimal signal can always be constructed
such that the components in the noise vector vt of the signal st are independent. Throughout
the paper we will focus on the signal structure such that Vt is diagonal for each t. In this case
Ct is unique up to a scalar constant and up to an interchange of rows. When Ct is scaled by a
constant b, Vt is scaled by b
2. By the Kalman filter, the impulse responses to structural shocks
to all state variables do not change, but the responses to noise shocks are scaled by 1/b. Notice
that the optimal signal components are in general not independent in the sense that the matrix Ct
may not be diagonal or invertible. The signal independence is a common assumption employed in
the literature (e.g., Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009)), but we show that this assumption can be
restrictive and lead to suboptimal solutions.
3 Semidefinite Programming
In this section we adopt the semidefinite programming approach recently proposed by Tanaka et al
(2017) to solve the tracking or rate distortion problems in both finite- and infinite-horizon settings.
We also provide some characterization results for some special cases.
3.1 Finite-Horizon Problems
We follow the three-step procedure in Tanaka et al (2017) closely. The first step is to transform (24)




only. We eliminate the control {Φt} and replace
(25) and (26) by the constraints
0 ≺ Σt|t  At−1Σt−1|t−1A′t−1 +Wt−1, t = 1, 2, ..., T, (28)
and
0 ≺ Σ0|0  Σ0. (29)
These constraints are called the no-forgetting constraints by Sims (2003, 2011). Intuitively, observ-
ing signals st over time will reduce uncertainty about the state. Sims (2003, 2011) recommends to
use a Cholesky decomposition as the new choice variable to handle the no-forgetting constraints
for the infinite-horizon model studied in Section 3.3. We do not follow his approach.
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In the next two steps we transform the problem above into a determinant maximization problem
subject to linear matrix inequality constraints. The latter problem is convex and can be solved effi-
ciently by standard optimization methods developed in the mathematics literature (Vandenberghe,
Boyd, and Wu (1998)). This approach can be implemented using the publicly available semidef-
inite programming solver SDPT3 described in Appendix C (Toh, Todd, and Tutuncu (1999) and
Tutuncu, Toh, and Todd (2003)).10 We summarize the analysis above in the following result and
present the technical details in Appendix A.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Wt  0 and Ωt  0, for t = 0, 1, ..., T. Then the optimal information
structure {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 for problem (22) or (24) can be constructed by solving the following determi-











log det Πt + c (33)






 0, t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1, (34)











The optimal sequence {Φt}Tt=0 is obtained from (31) and (32). The optimal information structure
{Ct, Vt}Tt=0 is given in Proposition 3.
10This solver applies interior point methods implemented by a primal-dual infeasible-interior-point algorithm.
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The key difference between the problem above and that in Tanaka et al (2017) is that we have a
single distortion constraint in (23) or (27), while they have a sequence of distortion constraints. The
constraint (29) is also absent in their optimization problem. Moreover, our distortion constraint
is derived from a LQG control problem, while their constraints are imposed exogenously from
information theory. Following their arguments, we can show that there always exists an optimal
solution to the problem in Proposition 4. Moreover, it is a strictly convex optimization problem
and hence the optimal solution is unique.
The assumption of W  0 can be restrictive in economic applications. This assumption implies
that there must be a nontrivial random shock to each state transition equation (1). It is possible
that there is no random shock to the state transition equation for some state variables. For example,
we typically assume that the capital stock kt follows the law of motion kt+1 = (1− δ) kt+ It, where
δ > 0 denotes the depreciation rate and It denotes investment. To get around this issue, one can
eliminate this constraint by substituting out It. Another way is to introduce a depreciation or
capital quality shock often used in the literature. See Section 4.3 for the details. Alternatively, we
allow W  0 and present a result similar to Proposition 4 in Appendix B. We need to impose a new
assumption that A is invertible. This assumption can also be restrictive. For example, it rules out
the case in which an IID shock is used as a state variable. This shock may represent a component
of the TFP shock that enters the profit function in a firm’s price setting problem or investment
problem analyzed in Section 4.
For the relaxed problem under RI in Problem 3, we can use a similar three-step procedure.
In particular, the optimal control is given by ut = −Ftx̂t in step 1 by the certainty equivalence
principle. In step 2 we derive the relaxed tracking problem under RI in which the information-flow
constraint is removed. In step 3 we use the semidefinite programming approach to transform this














log det Πt + λc
subject to (28), (29), (34), and (35). Using the solution to this problem and equations (31) and (32),
we determine the optimal sequence {Φt}Tt=0 . Proposition 3 gives the optimal information structure
{Ct, Vt}Tt=0 .
After obtaining the solutions for {Ft,Σt, Ct, Vt} , we use the system of equations (1), (2), (9),
(14), and (15) to generate impulse responses and simulations of the model.
3.2 Static Case
For the static case with T = 0, problem (30) or (33) becomes
15
Problem 6 (Static rate distortion problem)







log det Σ (36)
subject to
tr(ΩΣ) ≤ D, 0 ≺ Σ  Σ0. (37)
Here we use Σ to denote Σ0|0 and Ω to denote Ω0 only in this subsection, without risk of
confusion. Notice that Σ0 is the prior covariance matrix of the nx × 1 random vector x0. The
decision maker receives a multi-dimensional signal s0 = Cx0 + v0, where v0 is a normal random
vector with mean zero and covariance matrix V.
When Ω is an identity matrix and Σ0 is diagonal, the problem admits the standard reverse
water-filling solution analyzed by Cover and Thomas (2006). The general case with Ω  0 and
Σ0  0 is nontrivial.11 Fulton (2018) presents a similar result to ours, but our proof given in the
appendix is different and much simpler than his.
Before stating our result, we introduce some notations. Let Σ
1
2
0  0 denote the positive definite














′, where U is an orthonormal matrix and Ωd ≡ diag (d1, ..., dnx) is a diagonal
































, if 0 < D <
∑nx
i=1 di.
Here the Lagrange multiplier α > 0 is chosen such that
∑nx
i=1 diΣ̂i = D. The rate distortion function
is given by









The optimal information structure satisfies
C ′V −1C = Σ
− 1
2
















2U ′ = Σ̂0 is diagonal. Then the reverse water-filling solution applies to Σ̂.
16







is diagonal and Ω is identity, where σ2i > 0 for all i. In this case di = σ
2
i > 0




i , the decision maker will not
process any information to allocate attention to any source of uncertainty so that Σ̂ = I, Σ = Σ0,
and κ0 (D) = 0. If the distortion is small enough such that 0 < D <
∑nx
i=1 di, the decision maker
will process information to reduce uncertainty such that the posterior variance for the ith source





The decision maker allocates attention to the sources of uncertainty with high prior variances
σ2i according to a decreasing order so that the posterior variances are reduced to 1/α < σ
2
i . This
process continues until the distortion constraint binds at some level of variance. The decision maker
will not allocate any attention to any source of uncertainty with variance below that level.
In the general case di is the ith eigenvalue of the weighted prior covariance matrix and Σ̂ may
be interpreted as a scaling factor for these eigenvalues. The attention is allocated according to a
decreasing order of {di} , instead of prior variances. High eigenvalues di are scaled down by the
factor Σ̂i = 1/ (αdi) < 1 for small distortions.
Proposition 5 also shows that, even though the prior information is independent (Σ0 is diagonal),
if Ω is not a diagonal matrix, the posterior variance Σ will not be diagonal in general. This means
that rational inattention induces ex post correlation of uncertainty across initially independent
information (Sims (2011)).
The following result characterizes the signal dimension.
Corollary 1 Suppose that Ω  0 and Σ0  0 in Problem 6. If 0 < D < mini {mdi > 0} where m ≡
rank(Ω) , then the optimal signal dimension is equal to m. The signal dimension (weakly) decreases
as D increases if positive eigenvalues di > 0 are not identical.
This corollary states that when the distortion is sufficiently small or when the information-flow
rate is sufficiently large, the decision maker constructs a signal with the highest dimension, which
is equal to rank(Ω) . By (19) the rank does not exceed the minimum of the numbers of controls and
states, nu and nx. As the distortion gradually increases or the information-flow rate decreases, the
decision maker processes less information so that the signal dimension decreases.









log det Σ (39)
subject to 0 ≺ Σ  Σ0, where λ > 0 is interpreted as the shadow price or cost of information. We
can similarly prove the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose that Ω  0 and Σ0  0. Then the optimal solution to the static relaxed RI
17






























The signal dimension is equal to the number of di such that di > λ/2 and decreases as λ increases.
It is intuitive that the decision maker acquires fewer information signals as the information cost
becomes larger. In the special case with 2di > λ > 0 for all i = 1, 2, .., nx, we have Σ̂i = λ/ (2di) for
all i and hence Σ−1 = 2Ω/λ. In this case the information cost is sufficiently low so that the signal
dimension is equal to rank(Ω) = nx and the no-forgetting constraint does not bind.
3.3 Infinite-horizon Stationary Problems
For the infinite-horizon stationary problem, all matrices At, Bt, Wt, Ct, and Vt are time invariant.
We consider the stationary Kalman filter for which Σt|t → Σ,
























where Φ = C ′V −1C  0.
























(xt − x̂t)′Ω(xt − x̂t)
]
= tr(ΩΣ),
where Ω is given by (20). Thus the distortion rate problem is given by
D (κ) ≡ min
Σ0, Φ0
tr(ΩΣ) (43)
subject to (42) and
1
2
log det(AΣA′ +W )− 1
2
log det Σ ≤ κ.
This problem is similar to that analyzed by Sims (2003) with three differences. First he removes
the choice variable Φ by replacing (42) by the following no-forgetting constraint without affecting
the optimal solution for Σ :
AΣA′ +W  Σ. (44)
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Second, we derive the matrix Ω from a more general LQG control problem, which is positive
semidefinite. This guarantees that minimization problem always has a solution. Finally, we derive
the optimal information structure {C, V } using Φ = C ′V −1C and (42), while Sims (2003) assumes
that the signal vector is given by st = xt + ξt, where he calls ξt the information-processing-induced
measurement error.
The corresponding rate distortion problem becomes:
Problem 7 (Infinite-horizon stationary rate distortion problem)




log det(AΣA′ +W )− 1
2
log det Σ (45)
subject to (44) and
tr(ΩΣ) ≤ D. (46)
As in Section 3.1 we use the semidefinite programming approach to solve this problem.
Proposition 7 Suppose that W  0 and Ω  0. Then the optimal solution to Problem 7 can be














The optimal Φ is determined by (42) and the optimal information structure {C, V } satisfies Φ =
C ′V −1C.
Because of the difficulty of the dynamic multivariate RI problems, characterization results are
rarely available in the literature. We are able to derive an analytical result for the special case
in which all states are equally persistent in the sense that A = ρI with |ρ| < 1. We find that the
stationary RI problem also admits a generalized reverse water-filling solution similar to that in
Proposition 5 for the static case.
Let us introduce some notations used in the result below. Let W
1
2  0 denote the positive










′, where U is an orthonormal matrix and Ωd ≡ diag(d1, ..., dnx) is a






Proposition 8 Suppose that Ω  0, W  0, and A = ρI with |ρ| < 1 in Problem 7. Then the







































 , (=∞, if di = 0),
and the Lagrange multiplier α > 0 is the unique positive solution to the equation D =
∑nx
i=1 diΣ̂i.
The rate distortion function is given by














The optimal information structure {C, V } satisfies























i=1 di), no information is processed so that Σ




. For small distortions, the
high eigenvalues di of the weighted state noise covariance matrix are scaled down by the factor
Σ̂i. In the special IID case we have A = 0 and xt+1 = But + εt+1. The proposition above is
reduced to Proposition 5 in the static case. We can also verify that, in the special scalar case with
nx = 1 and Ω = 1, this proposition is reduced to Proposition 4 of Maćkowiak and Wiederholt
(2009). Specifically, using their notations and base 2 logarithm, set W = d1 = a
2, C = 1, and
κ (D) = κj > 0. We can derive Σ̂1 = Σ̂
∗
1 = D/a




, and st = xt + vt, where the
variance of vt is
V =
22κja2
(22κj − 1) (22κj − ρ2)
.
The following result is analogous to the static case:
Corollary 2 Suppose that Ω  0, W  0, and A = ρI with |ρ| < 1 in Problem 7. If D > 0 is
sufficiently small, then the optimal signal dimension is equal to m ≡ rank(Ω) . The signal dimension
(weakly) decreases as D increases if positive eigenvalues di > 0 are not identical.
For the general case, we are unable to derive analytical results, but Proposition 7 offers a useful
formulation to implement an efficient numerical procedure using semidefinite programming. After
obtaining the solutions for {F,Σ, C, V } , we use the system of equations (5), (11), (21), (40), and
(41) to generate impulse responses and simulations of the model. By contrast, Sims (2003, p. 679)
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adopts a different system in which he assumes that the signal vector is given by st = xt + ξt. Our
numerical results in the next section show that this signal vector may be suboptimal for multivariate
problems. It is optimal if the signal-to-noise ratio Φ defined in (42) is nonsingular. In this case the
no-forgetting constraint (44) does not bind. Whenever this constraint binds, Φ is singular and the
signal dimension is less than the number of state variables.
Using a similar procedure, we can derive the optimal control ut = −Fx̂t for the relaxed problem
under RI in Problem 4. The optimal conditional covariance matrix Σ and information structure









subject to (44) and (47). We can derive results similar to Propositions 7 and 8, and Corollary 2.
In particular the critical parameter is λ instead of D. For space considerations we omit the details.
4 Applications
In this section we study three applications to illustrate our results. We analyze a pure tracking
problem in the first application and dynamic control problems in the other two. In the first
application there are two exogenous states and one control. In the second application there are
one endogenous and two exogenous states and one control. In the last application there are two
endogenous and two exogenous states and two controls.
4.1 Price Setting
We first consider a single firm’s price setting problem adapted from Maćkowiak and Wiederholt
(2009).12 Unlike their model we do not consider the general equilibrium price feedback effect. We
focus on an infinite-horizon stationary tracking problem under RI.
Let the profit-maximizing price satisfy p∗t = a
′xt, where a = (a1, a2)
′ and xt = (x1t, x2t)
′ is an
VAR(1) process xt = Axt−1 + εt, where A = diag(ρ1, ρ2) with |ρ1| < 1, |ρ2| < 1, and εt ≡ (ε1t, ε2t)
′
is a Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix W  0. The firm does not observe any states and








, and Ω = aa′.










(xt − x̂t)′Ω (xt − x̂t)
]
subject to the information-flow constraint (4).










12See Woodford (2003, 2009) for related pricing models.
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where x̂t satisfies the Kalman filter:
x̂t = (I −KC)Ax̂t−1 +Kst, (49)
for t ≥ 0, with x̂−1 = 0 and {C, V } being the solution to the above minimization problem. Here
K ≡ (AΣA′ +W )C ′ [C (AΣA′ +W )C ′ + V ]−1 is the Kalman gain.
We are able to derive an analytical result for the special case in which all states have the same
persistence parameter ρ.13
Proposition 9 Consider the infinite-horizon stationary rate distortion problem in (45) with p∗t =
a′xt, Ω = aa
′, W  0, and A = ρI (|ρ| < 1). If 0 < D <
(
1− ρ2
)−1 ∥∥W 1/2a∥∥2 , then κ (D) > 0,




∥∥∥W 1/2a∥∥∥ vt, (50)



























. The rate distortion function is given by








∥∥∥W 1/2a∥∥∥2 /D)} .
Equation (50) shows that the optimal signal can be normalized as the profit-maximizing price
plus a noise when ρ1 = ρ2. This signal form implies that the impulse responses of prices to the ith
source of shock are relatively larger if and only if that source carries a larger weight ai as shown in
equations (48) and (49). The price responses are the same when a1 = a2. This result is independent
of the dimension of states and the innovation covariance matrix W . By contrast, Maćkowiak and
Wiederholt (2009) assume that the firm receives one signal about each shock and the two signals
are independent. They argue that this assumption is reasonable in practice, even though it does
not lead to optimal decisions. They show that the price is more responsive to the shock with a
higher variance even when ρ1 = ρ2 and a1 = a2.
13When ρ = 0, Proposition 9 is reduced to the IID case, which is also the static case by setting W = Σ0, studied
by Fulton (2018).
14We use ‖·‖ to denote the Euclidean norm.
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Now suppose that ρ1 6= ρ2. Based on numerical solutions for a wide range of parameter values,
we find that the optimal signal is still one dimensional, but it cannot take the normalized form of
the profit-maximizing price plus a noise. Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) informally argue that
the optimal signal should always take that normalized form. Our numerical results show that this
claim is incorrect when ρ1 6= ρ2. In particular, let C = (C1, C2) for the one dimensional signal
st = Cxt + vt. Normalize a1 = C1 = 1. We find C2 6= a2 when ρ1 6= ρ2.
It follows from equations (48) and (49) that the initial impact of the two shocks on the optimal
price under RI is determined by two effects. First, the learning effect is reflected by the term a′K
due to signal extraction. Second, the attention allocation effect is reflected by the optimal choice of
Σ, C, and V. Given a one dimensional signal, the initial response is determined by a′KC. Thus the
initial response to the second shock is larger than to the first shock if and only if C2 > C1 = 1, or
if and only if the firm pays more attention to the second shock. To see the impact quantitatively,




as baseline values. We
may interpret the first (second) shock as the aggregate (idiosyncratic) shock. Aggregate shocks are
typically more persistent, but less volatile than idiosyncratic shocks.
Figure 1 presents the rate distortion function and the signal noise variance as a function of
the distortion. The rate distortion function is convex and decreasing in κ. We can then find the
distortion or tracking error D for any information-flow rate κ > 0. Comparative statics with respect
to D can be equivalently translated into those with respect to κ. Figure 1 also shows that the signal
noise variance increases with the distortion or decreases with κ.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
The top two panels of Figure 2 plot the impulse response functions for three values of κ. We
find that the responses under RI are dampened and delayed, compared to the full information case.
When the channel capacity κ is larger, the firm can process more information and hence the price
is more responsive to shocks. We also find that the initial responses to the aggregate shock are
larger than those to the idiosyncratic shock for all values of κ, because the firm attends more to
the more persistent aggregate shock.
[Insert Figures 2-3 Here]
To further investigate the role of persistence and innovation variance, the bottom two panels






of the aggregate shock fixed as in Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009).15 We also hold the other
baseline values fixed. We find that, as we gradually increase the aggregate shock persistence ρ1,
the initial response to the aggregate shock increases, while the initial response to the idiosyncratic
shock declines, suggesting that the firm shifts attention to the aggregate shock away from the
idiosyncratic shock. Moreover, the initial response to the aggregate shock is larger (smaller) than
15Our results do not change significantly if we hold σ1 fixed.
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that to the idiosyncratic shock whenever ρ1 > (<)ρ2, even though the aggregate shock has a much
smaller innovation variance. When ρ1 = ρ2, the responses to the two sources of shocks are identical
given a1 = a2, regardless of innovation variances, as Proposition 9 shows.











Thus the conditional variances of both shocks decrease and the two shocks are less negatively
conditionally correlated. The learning effect causes a′K to increase from 0.5894 to 0.6520. In the
meantime, the firm shifts more attention to the aggregate shock as C2 decreases from 1.0576 to
0.8920 for fixed C1 = 1. The attention allocation effect dominates so that the response to the
idiosyncratic shock a′KC2 declines.
The top two panels of Figure 3 plot the impact of idiosyncratic volatility σ2, holding all other
parameter values fixed at the baseline values. We find that as σ2 becomes larger the optimal price
under RI is more responsive initially to both sources of shocks, but the differences are not large and
the price reverts back to the steady state faster. By contrast, Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009)
find that the price is less responsive to the aggregate shock and more responsive to the idiosyncratic
shock because the firm shifts attention to the idiosyncratic shock away from the aggregate shock.
In our model without the signal independence assumption, there is a spillover of one source of
uncertainty into the other.16 The learning effect causes a′K to increase as σ2 increases so that
the price is more responsive to both sources of shocks. In the meantime the firm allocates more
attention to the idiosyncratic shock in that C2/C1 increases, but still C2 < C1. Overall the learning
effect dominates.
We experiment with a wide range of economically reasonable values for ρ1 ∈ (0, 1), ρ2 ∈ (0, 1) ,
σ1 ∈ (0, 0.5) , and σ2 ∈ (0, 0.5) and find our preceding results are robust. Notably the persistence
plays a dominant role. The optimal price under RI is always more responsive to the shock with
higher persistence even though the other shock has a much larger innovation variance.17 The
reason is that the impact of the difference in the innovation variance is mitigated because of the
information spillover effect discussed earlier. For very large values of σ2 given ρ1 > ρ2, we find
some numerical examples in which the price is slightly more responsive to the second shock than
to the first shock. However, due to large numerical errors associated with high variance values, we
do not consider these examples particularly convincing.
So far we have fixed a1 = a2 = 1 for all previous numerical experiments. We now consider the
impact of a2 in the bottom two panels of Figure 3, holding all other parameter values fixed at the
16Mondria (2010) finds a similar result in a static asset pricing model.
17Our numerical results are more robust for the relaxed problem formulation with constant cost of information
flow. In particular, in the large σ2 limit, the initial price responses to the second shock catch up and converge to
those to the first shock when ρ1 > ρ2. Such an analysis is available upon request.
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baseline values. We find that as a2 increases from 0.5 to 5, the initial responses to the second shock
increase, while the initial responses to the first shock decrease. This result reflects the intuition
that the firm allocates more attention to the shock that carries a relatively larger weight in its
objective function and hence the price is more responsive to that shock.
4.2 Consumption/Saving
In this subsection we study a consumption/saving problem similar to those in Hall (1978), Sims







βt (ct − c̄)2
]
subject to the budget constraint
wt+1 = (1 + r) (wt − ct) + yt+1, t ≥ 0,
where c̄ is a bliss level of consumption, wt is wealth, and yt is income. For simplicity we suppose
β (1 + r) = 1. Suppose that income yt consists of two persistent components and a transitory
component:
yt = ȳ + z1,t + z2,t + εy,t,
z1,t = ρ1z1,t−1 + η1,t,
z2,t = ρ2z2,t−1 + η2,t,
where ȳ is average income and innovations εy,t, η1t, and η2t are mutually independent Gaussian




2. The two persistent components z1,t and z2,t, and the
transitory component εy,t may capture aggregate, local, and individual income uncertainties. The
state vector is xt = (wt, z1,t, z2,t)
′ plus a constant state 1.
By the certainty equivalence principle, it is straightforward to show that optimal consumption










1 + r − ρ1
ẑ1,t +
ρ2








. We need to use numerical methods to solve for the optimal information
structure {C, V } for the signal vector st = Cxt + vt. Set the same parameter values as in Sims
(2003): β = 0.95, ρ1 = 0.97, ρ2 = 0.90, σ
2
y = 0.01, σ
2
1 = 0.0001, and σ
2
2 = 0.003.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
We find that the optimal signal vector st is one dimensional and C = [1, 11.7433, 5.8978] and
V = 0.0079 for κ = 1.5746.18 Thus the household processes information about a linear combination
18We normalize C1 = 1 for all cases.
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of all three state variables with the more persistent shock z1,t having the largest weight. As κ
decreases, this weight increases slightly, while the weight on the less persistent shock z2,t barely
changes. Moreover, the signal noise variance increases significantly. Intuitively, the household pays
more attention to the more persistent income shock and the signal becomes more noisy when the
information capacity decreases. We also find that the signal is always one dimensional even for a
very large κ when the distortion is close to zero. This is in contrast to Sims’s (2003) finding that
the signal is three dimensional when κ is sufficiently large (see his Figures 7 and 8).
Figure 4 plots the impulse response functions for consumption to 1% shocks to the three true
income components and one signal noise, starting from zero consumption.19 The flat lines corre-
spond to the responses for the full information case. Under RI, the consumption responses to all
three true component income shocks are damped initially, and then gradually rise permanently to
high levels. Intuitively, the rationally inattentive household responds to shocks sluggishly. Lower
consumption early leads to higher wealth. The extra savings earn a return 1 + r and allow the
household to accumulate higher wealth to fund higher consumption later. We also find that the
initial response is larger for a more persistent income shock given the same κ. And the initial
responses to all true income shocks are larger when κ is larger. Unlike the income shocks, the noise
shock causes consumption to rise immediately and then gradually decreases over time.
Our numerical results are different from that reported by Sims (2003). His Figures 7 and 8
show that the initial consumption response to the less persistent income shock is larger. He argues
that this is because the innovation to this shock has a larger variance. Based on a wide range of
parameter values, we find that the initial response to the more persistent income shock is always
larger, independent of the innovation variance. This result is consistent with our earlier finding for
the pricing example.
4.3 Firm Investment
We finally solve a firm’s investment problem subject to convex adjustment costs. The firm chooses







































19By a change of state variables, Luo (2008) shows that the original multivariate consumption/saving problem
can be reduced to a univariate problem. One can verify that using his method delievers the same impulse response
functions as ours.
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where dt, k1,t, k2,t, I1,t, and I2,t denote dividends, tangible capital, intangible capital, tangible capital
investment, and intangible capital investment, respectively. The parameters satisfy δ1, δ2, α, θ, τ ∈
(0, 1) , α + θ < 1, and φ1, φ2 > 0. The variables zt and et represent persistent and temporary
Gaussian TFP shocks, zt = ρzt−1 + εz,t. We include taxation of corporate profits because a key
distinction between the two types of capital is that a fraction χ of intangible investment is expensed
and therefore exempt from taxation. The capital evolution equations are
k1,t+1 = (1− δ1) k1,t + I1,t + ε1,t+1,
k2,t+1 = (1− δ2) k2,t + I2,t + ε2,t+1,
where ε1,t+1 and ε2,t+1 represent depreciation or capital quality shocks. Suppose that εz,t, et, ε1,t,









To solve this problem numerically, we first approximate the firm’s objective function by a
quadratic function in the neighborhood of the nonstochastic steady state. We then obtain a linear-
quadratic control problem with the state vector xt =
(
zt, et, k̃1,t, k̃2,t
)′
plus a constant state 1,
where k̃i,t, i = 1, 2, denotes the deviation from the steady state. From this problem we can derive
the decision rules and the weighting matrix Ω in the tracking problem in which the relevant state
vector is xt. For the no adjustment cost case under full information, the linearized optimal decision





where ki is the steady-state capital stock. Notice that the optimal capital and investment choice is
independent of transitory shocks et.
We now solve the transformed rate distortion problem using the semidefinite programming
approach. We set baseline parameter values as in McGrattan and Prescott (2010): α = 0.26,
θ = 0.076, δ1 = 0.126, δ2 = 0.05, τ = 0.35, and χ = 0.5. Set ρ = 0.91, σz = σ1 = σ2 = 0.01,
and σe = 0.1. We choose β = 0.9615 to generate a 4 percent steady state interest rate. Following
Saporta-Eksten and Terry (2018), we set the capital adjustment cost parameter values as φ1 = 0.46
and φ2 = 1.40. For these parameter values, the steady-state levels of capital are k1 = 0.98 and
k2 = 0.639.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 here.]
Since this model features two control variables and four state variables, we can study the non-
trivial determination of the information structure. Figure 5 presents the rate distortion function
and the signal dimension as we vary the distortion with and without adjustment costs. At suffi-
ciently low distortion or high channel capacity the signal dimension is 2. However, if the distortion
is high enough (or channel capacity falls below a critical value), the signal dimension drops by 1;
the firm, in an attempt to conserve channel capacity, only processes a single signal. The critical
amount of capacity is higher in the presence of adjustment costs.
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To understand how the signal dimension changes, we display here the optimal signal structure
for two values of κ with no adjustment costs: For κ = 0.0203
st = −0.81zt + 0.24k̃1,t + 0.53k̃2,t + vt,
where the variance of vt is 1.35, and for κ = 0.2242
st =
[
−0.87zt + 0.40k̃1,t + 0.26k̃2,t
0.06zt − 0.45k̃1,t + 0.89k̃2,t
]
+ vt,
where the covariance matrix of vt is diag(0.07, 0.27) . With adjustment costs, the optimal signal
structure is similar.
Note that in neither case does the signal depend on et, the transitory productivity shock;
since et does not affect the value-maximizing level of investment under full information, there is
no point using information capacity to learn about it. Thus rational inattention does not explain
why investment responds to transitory shocks in the data documented by Saporta-Eksten and Terry
(2018). If the information structure is exogenously given as in a standard signal extraction problem,
then firms would be confused about the source of a productivity change; as a result, they would
respond to transitory shocks. However, since value-maximizing investment is independent of the
transitory shock et, if the firm can choose the allocation of attention, it will ignore the transitory
shock completely.
The intuition for the above signal forms can be better understood as follows. The variables the
firm cares about are the TFP and the (linearized) marginal products of tangible and intangible
capital (mpk1t and mpk2t). We can then use a change of variables to express the signal vector st
in terms of a linear transformation of the new vector [zt, et,mpk1t,mpk2t]
′ . For example, the linear
transformation is given by C =
[
0.061 0.872 −1.823 −3.553
]
for the case of no adjustment
costs and κ = 0.0203. A positive persistent change in TFP zt will be confused with a positive
change in et, which explains why both of these coefficients are positive. Since the firm does not want
investment to respond to et, it must correct the confusion by believing that the marginal products
of capital fall, which in turn explains why these coefficients are negative. With higher capacity





−0.033 0.844 −2.395 −2.033
0.244 0.186 1.552 −5.093
]
.
In this case the firm does not have to believe that both marginal products of capital fall. This
explains why there is only one negative coefficient in the second row of C.
We now turn to the impulse responses of two types of capital investment to a positive 1% shock
to the persistent TFP component displayed in Figure 6. Each panel of the figure includes the full
information case as well as at least one case with sufficiently low κ such that the signal vector
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becomes one-dimensional. The top two panels show the case without adjustment costs. Under full
information, in response to a positive persistent TFP shock, investment increases immediately and
then falls back to the steady state following a path similar to the TFP shock. As the information-
flow rate κ falls, the investment responses under RI become dampened and delayed – investment
rises less on impact and remains above the steady state longer. If κ is sufficiently small, then the
signal becomes one dimensional and the responses are very small and persistent (see dashed lines).
In the case with adjustment costs displayed in the bottom two panels, investment responses
under RI are delayed further, and can become hump-shaped, a pattern not present in the full
information case. The reason for the hump-shape is a horse race between two effects. Consider the
response of tangible investment to a positive TFP shock zt (bottom left panel). Value-maximizing
investment under full information rises on impact and then gradually falls back to the steady state,
but at a slower rate than the case without adjustment costs. Under rational inattention, since the
firm does not know zt with certainty, exactly how much investment has risen is unknown. Since
the firm learns slowly and the capital adjustment is costly, it takes several periods before the firm
knows the investment level it should have chosen on impact, which leads to a rising investment
path. On the other hand, since zt is mean reverting the value-maximizing level of investment is
falling over time. Thus optimal investment under RI will eventually falls back to the steady state.
Without adjustment costs, mean reversion is sufficiently fast such that learning is always behind,
leading to monotonic but delayed responses. With adjustment costs, but without information-flow
constraint, there is no hump-shaped investment response either.
Our results are similar to Zorn’s (2018) findings, while his model has only one type of capital
and assumes there is no capital quality shock.20 He documents evidence that investment at the
sectoral level displays a hump-shaped response to aggregate shocks and a monotonic response to
sectoral shocks. He shows that a model with both rational inattention and capital adjustment costs
can deliver the two different types of responses. In contrast, models with just capital adjustment
costs, models with just investment adjustment costs (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)),
and models with just rational inattention cannot match both types of impulse responses.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a framework to analyze multivariate RI problems in a LQG setup. We have
proposed a three-step solution procedure to theoretically analyze and numerically solve these prob-
lems. We have provided generalized reverse water-filling solutions to some special cases. We have
also applied our approach to three economic examples. Our analysis demonstrates that the existing
20Notice that this assumption is subtle. Without capital quality shocks εi,t+1, ki,t+1 is measurable with respect
to date t information. The firm only needs to track the persistent shock zt and the optimal signal is always one
dimensional. Such an analysis is available upon request.
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solution approach proposed by Sims (2003, 2011) is flawed and not robust. Moreover, many sim-
plifying assumptions adopted in the literature such as signal independence and exogenous signal
structure are not innocuous. They lead to suboptimal behavior and some qualitatively different
predictions from ours. While some simplifying assumptions may be justified by bounded rational-
ity and deliver interesting results, removing these assumptions can generate new insights such as
different roles of the shock persistence and the innovation variance, information spillover, and price
comovement. Our approach provides researchers a useful toolkit to solve multivariate RI problems




Proof of Proposition 1: Let Ft denote the information set at time t under full information.
The value function under full information is given by (7) and satisfies the Bellman equation:



















where u∗t = −Ftxt denotes the optimal control under full information and
x∗t+1 = Atxt +Bu
∗
t + εt+1. (A.2)
Let v̂t(x̂t) denote the value function under RI at date t given information s
t. The state variable is














where the optimal control is ut = −Ftx̂t.





− v̂t(x̂t) = E
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Using the first-order condition with respect to u∗t , we have
S′txt = −Rtu∗t − βB′tPt+1Atxt − βB′tPt+1Btu∗t .





























































(u∗t − ut)′(Rt + βB′tPt+1Bt)(u∗t − ut)|st
]
.






− v̂t(x̂t) = E
[























Solving (A.5) recursively and taking the expectation with respect to the initial distribution for










(xt − x̂t)′Ωt(xt − x̂t)
]
,
where Ωt is given by (19). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: See the main text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: For simplicity we omit the time t subscript for all variables in the
proof. By the singular-value decomposition of a positive semidefinite matrix, there exists an nx×nx








where Ψ̂ = diag(ϕ1, ..., ϕm) is an m ×m diagonal matrix and {ϕi}mi=1 are the positive eigenvalues
of Φ. Clearly, rank(Φ) = m ≤ nx. The matrix Φ can be factored into Ψ = ∆′Ψ̂∆, where ∆ =[
Im 0m×(nx−m)
]
. Let C = ∆U ′ and V = Ψ̂−1, completing the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We already presented the first step in the main text. In the second
step we rewrite the objective function in (30) by regrouping terms as a sum of the initial cost
1






















for t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1. The matrix determinant lemma (Theorem 18.1.1 in Harville (1997)) implies



































In the final step we apply the matrix inversion formula to rewrite (A.6) as













 0, Πt  0,
by the Schur complement property. Note that this is a linear matrix inequality condition. Com-
bining the three steps we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.







































We rewrite the objection function as
1
2



































Using the rotation invariance property of the trace operator, we derive


























We also show that










































⇐⇒ Σ̂  I.
Thus we can rewrite the static RI problem as




















where Σ̂ii is the diagonal element of Σ̂. The equality holds if and only if Σ̂ is diagonal. Thus, if
diagonal elements of Σ̂ are fixed, det Σ̂ is maximized by setting all off-diagonal entries to zero. The






the optimization problem becomes







0 < Σ̂i ≤ 1 all i,
nx∑
i=1
diΣ̂i ≤ D. (A.7)









where α > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the distortion constraint. We then obtain
the solution for Σ in the proposition. The optimal signal-to-noise ratio is given by
































The dimension of the signal vector is equal to the rank of Φ, which is equal to the rank of the
matrix diag{max (0, αdi − 1)nxi=1} . This rank is less or equal to the rank of Ωd or Ω. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: Let the Lagrange multiplier α satisfy m/α = D, where m denotes the







mini {di > 0}
di
≤ 1.
It follows from Proposition 5 that Σ̂i = 1/ (αdi) for all i with di > 0, and Σ̂i = 1 for all i with
di = 0. Notice that α = m/D is such that
∑nx
i=1 diΣ̂i = D. Since αdi > 1 for all i with di > 0, it
follows from Proposition 5 that the signal dimension is equal to the rank of Ω.
Without loss of generality we suppose that d1 is the unique smallest positive eigenvalue and
dm ≥ ... ≥ d2 > d1 > 0. The other eigenvalues are equal to zero. We show that the signal dimension
is equal to m− 1 when
md1 < D < (m− 1) d2 + d1.





Then we can check that αd1 < 1 and αdi > 1 for i = 2, ...,m. Since dj = 0 for m < j ≤ nx, the
dimension of diag{max (0, αdi − 1)nxi=1} is equal to m − 1. It follows from Proposition 5 that the
signal dimension is equal to m− 1. By a similar procedure we can show that the signal dimension
decreases as D increases as long as Ω has many different positive eigenvalues. Q.E.D.















0 ≺ Σ̂  I.


















Σ̂i ≤ 1 all i.









The optimal signal-to-noise ratio is given by







































Thus the signal dimension is equal to the number of di such that di > λ/2 and decreases as λ
increases. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: See the main text and the proof of Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: As discussed in Section 3.3, we only need to solve the rate distortion
problem (45). The matrix determinant lemma implies that
1
2













Thus this problem becomes




log detW − 1
2







AΣA′ +W  Σ, (A.10)
tr(ΩΣ) ≤ D. (A.11)






























As in the proof of Proposition 5, we can derive that
1
2
log detW − 1
2
log det Π = −1
2
log det Π̂.
Given A = ρI, we can also show that equations (A.9), (A.10), and (A.11) are equivalent to












Now the problem in (A.8) is equivalent to





subject to (A.12), (A.13), and (A.14). By the Hadamard inequality for positive definite matrices





where Π̂i is the diagonal element of Π̂. The equality holds if and only if Π̂ is diagonal. Thus, if
diagonal elements of Π̂ are fixed, det Π̂ is maximized by setting all off-diagonal entries to zero. As








Thus the problem is equivalent to






















≤ 1, i = 1, .., nx.
Equivalently rewriting this problem in terms of Σ̂i using (A.15) yields














diΣ̂i ≤ D, 0 < Σ̂i ≤
1
1− ρ2
, i = 1, ..., nx. (A.17)














where the Lagrange multiplier α associated with the first constraint in (A.17) and Σ̂∗i , i = 1, ..., nx,












To show the existence and uniqueness, we observe that there is a unique positive root Σ̂∗i to equation








This root decreases with α, approaches infinity as α → 0, and approaches zero as α → ∞. Thus,
























then there is a unique solution for α > 0 to equation (A.20) by the intermediate value theorem.
The optimal signal-to-noise ratio is given by
































































, then Σ̂i =
1
1−ρ2 for each i is the optimal solution to problem (A.16)
subject to (A.17). In this case Σ = W
1−ρ2 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2: The proof is similar to that of Corollary 1. Suppose that 0 < d1 ≤





for i = 1, 2...,m, if D > 0 is sufficiently small. For any dj = 0, m < j ≤ nx, the














is m. It follows
from Proposition 8 that the signal dimension is m.








As shown in (A.21), the positive root Σ̂∗i > 0 of equation (A.19) decreases with α > 0. We write it
as a decreasing function of α, Σ̂∗i (α) . It also decreases with di > 0. Thus one of the largest roots




























as a function of α has a unique positive root α > α∗1, when (A.23) is satisfied. When α > α
∗
1, we








for i = 1, 2, ...,m as desired.
Now suppose that dm ≥ ... ≥ d2 > d1 > 0. When D is sufficiently large, the solution α
to equation (A.24) decreases to a value smaller than α∗1. Then Σ̂
∗





largest element in the set {Σ̂∗i (α) : i = 1, ...,m} is Σ̂∗2 (α) . By the previous argument, there is a







There is a critical value D∗2 such that, when D
∗
1 < D < D
∗
2, the root of equation (A.24) satisfies
α∗2 < α < α
∗












for i = 2, 3, ...,m. For any dj = 0, m < j ≤ nx, the corresponding














is m−1. By a similar
procedure we can show that the signal dimension decreases as D increases as long as Ω has many
different positive eigenvalues. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: We consider the general case in which xt is an nx-dimensional vector.












2 has a unique
positive eigenvalue d1 ≡
∥∥W 1/2a∥∥2 and an associated unit eigenvector W 12a/∥∥W 1/2a∥∥ where ‖·‖








2a∥∥W 1/2a∥∥ = (W 12a)(W 12a)′ W
1








) ∥∥W 1/2a∥∥2∥∥W 1/2a∥∥ =
∥∥∥W 1/2a∥∥∥2 W 12a∥∥W 1/2a∥∥ .
39
Thus Ωd has only one positive element d1 =
∥∥W 1/2a∥∥2 and other diagonal elements di = 0 for
i = 2, ..., nx. Moreover, the optimal signal dimension is at most one.















, i = 2, ..., nx,







+ Σ̂∗1, D = d1Σ̂
∗
1.








The optimal information structure {C, V } satisfies







































The optimal information structure corresponds to the positive eigenvalue’s eigenvector and is given
by































Partition U = [U1, U2] conformably, where U1 = W
1
2a/


















Simplifying yields the expression in the proposition.













for all i so that Σ = ρ2Σ +W and the
firm does not process any information.
Using Proposition 8 we can derive the rate distortion function. Q.E.D.
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B The Case of W  0
Here we present the result for the rate distortion problem in the finite-horizon case. The results
for the finite-horizon relaxed problem and for the infinite-horizon case are similar and omitted.
Proposition 10 Suppose that Wt  0 is singular for some t, Ωt  0, and rank(At) = nx for
t = 0, 1, ..., T. Then the optimal information structure {Ct, Vt}Tt=0 for problem (22) or (24) can










log det Ψt + c
subject to (27), (28), (29) and the following constraints
ΣT |T = ΨT , Ψt  0, (B.1)[
















Proof: We can rewrite the objective function in (30) by regrouping terms as a sum of the initial






















for t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1. Since Wt is singular, we apply the matrix determinant lemma by employing
the decomposition Wt = MtM
′





































+ log |detAt| ,
provided that At is non-singular. Due to the monotonicity of the determinant function, this ex-






































By the Schur complement property, (B.3) is equivalent to[






Finally, summing up the sequence of period cost objectives subject to the constraint (27), (28),
(29), and (B.4), we obtain the representation in the proposition. Q.E.D. 
To illustrate the application of this proposition, we consider the LQG control problem with
VAR(p) state dynamics
xt = A1xt−1 +A2xt−2 + ...+Apxt−p +B0ut + εt,
where A1, ..., and Ap are n × n matrices and εt is Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix
W0  0. We transform the state dynamics into VAR(1) form:









, ε̄t is a Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix W, and
A =

A1 A2 ... Ap−1 Ap
In 0 .... 0 0
0 In .... 0 0
...
...
. . . 0 0
0 0 0 In 0














W0 [ In 0′ 0′ 0′ 0′ ] .
Now the problem fits in our general LQG RI framework. Notice that the covariance matrix of ε̄t
satisfies W  0, but it is singular. So Proposition 4 or 7 does not apply. As long as Ap is invertible
so that A is invertible, we can apply Proposition 10 to solve the model numerically.
C Numerical Implementation
For space considerations, we only describe the implementation of the infinite-horizon stationary
RI optimization problem. As discussed in the main text, we only need to solve the rate distortion
problem in Proposition 7. The relaxed problem and the finite-horizon problem can be similarly
solved. We apply the software package SDPT3, version 4.0, which can solve semidefinite program-
ming problems up to 100 dimensions efficiently and robustly (Toh, Todd, and Tutuncu (1999)
and Tutuncu, Toh, and Todd (2003)). Instead of presenting the general form of the optimization
problems that can be solved by this package, we focus on the form in which our problem can fit:
max









(Asj)T y + Zsj = csj , Zsj ∈ K
sj
s , j = 1, 2, ..., ns, (C.2)(
Al
)′
y + Z l = cl, Zl ∈ Rnl+ , (C.3)
where constraints (C.2) and (C.3) correspond to the linear matrix inequality and the linear vector
inequality in applications.
Let us explain the notations in this problem. The choice variables are an m-dimensional real
vector y, an sj-dimensional positive semidefinite matrix Z
s
j , and an nl-dimensional nonnegative
vector Z l. The set K
sj
s denotes the cone of positive semidefinite symmetric matrices of dimension sj .
In our application, Zsj and Z
l are slack variables that transform the matrix inequality constraints
and linear inequalities into equalities. All other variables are exogenous input parameters. In
particular, b is an m-dimensional vector, νjs ≥ 0 for all j, csj is an sj-dimensional matrix, Al is an
m by nl dimensional matrix, and c
l is an nl-dimensional vector.
Let Sn denote the set of all symmetric matrices. Define a vectorization operator for a symmetric
















2 is to make the operation isometry. We use the Matlab notation [U ;V ] to denote the
matrix obtained by appending V below the last row of U . Then we identfiy Asj with the following







where asj,1, ..., a
s
j,m are model specific input symmetric coefficient matrices of dimension sj associated





To use the software SDPT3, we need to transform our optimization problem in Proposition 7
into the form in (C.1), (C.2), and (C.3) by the following four steps.
Step 1. Set the choice variable y = [svec(Σ); svec(Π)] so that m = nx(nx + 1). The other
choice variables are the slack variables Zs1 , Z
s
2 , and Z
s
3 to be defined in Step 3. Set sj = nx.
Step 2. To derive the constraint (C.3), we consider (46) and write
tr(ΩΣ) = (svec(Ω))′svec(Σ).
Set nl = 1, A
l = [svec(Ω); 0], and cl = D. Introduce Z l ≥ 0. Then (46) is in the form of (C.3).
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Step 3. Derive the constraint (C.2). There are three linear matrix inequalities in our opti-




2 , and Z
s
3 . First, write the
semidefinite constraint Π  0 as






where as1,k, k = 1, ...,m, are coefficient matrices. To understand the last equation, consider the
































are in the vector y. Set cs1 = 0.
Second, we can similarly write the no-forgetting constraint (44) as






where as2,k, k = 1, ...,m, are coefficient matrices. Set c
s
2 = W . The Matlab file lmifun.m in our
code computes this transformation and As1 and As2.



































The Matlab file lmifun3.m in our code computes this transformation and the matrix As3.





After solving for optimal y = [svec(Σ); svec(Π)] , we use the inverse operator of svec, smat, to




be positive definite because the singular case will lead the objective function to approach negative
infinity. After solving for the optimal Π, we obtain the rate distortion function
κ(D) = −1
2




The Matlab file RIdata.m stores the problem input data in the above form and calls the main
Matlab function for SDPT3, sqlp.m. The accuracy tolerance in terms of the relative duality gap
and infeasibilities is 10−8. Using the dynamic price setting model as an example, the Matlab file
dyprice.m calls RIdata.m and computes the optimal solution for κ, Σ, and Φ, given the input A,
Ω, W, and D. The Matlab file sig.m computes the optimal information structure C and V , given
Φ. The file pricing M1.m computes the rate distortion function and the optimal signal variance V
in Figure 1 of the paper. The file pricing M2.m plots the impulse response functions for the four
comparative statics cases in Figures 2 and 3 of the paper.
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Figure 1: Rate distortion function and optimal noise variance for the price setting example.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of prices to positive 1% shocks to aggregate and idiosyncratic states
for various values of κ and ρ1.
49


























































Figure 3: Impulse responses of prices to positive 1% shocks to aggregate and idiosyncratic states
for various values of σ2 and a2.
50










































Figure 4: Impulse responses of consumption to positive 1% shocks to the transitory income com-
ponent (εy,t), two persistent income components (η1,t and η2,t), and the signal noise (vt).
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Figure 5: The signal dimension and rate distortion function for the investment example.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of tangible investment (I1,t) and intangible investment (I2,t) to a
positive 1% persistent TFP shock for the case without adjustment costs (top two panels) and the
case with adjustment costs (bottom two panels).
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